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COMMENTS
Landlord and Tenant-Prohibition of Retaliatory Eviction in
Landlord-Tenant Relations: A Study of Practice and Proposals
On August 12, 1974, Mr. and Mrs. Leon Fulcher, mobile home
owners, reported to the public health authorities that their sewage
system was defective, causing backup and resulting in an unsanitary
condition. The health department investigated and issued an order
requiring the park owner to remedy the problem.1 One day later the
Fulchers were evicted by the park owner. It was undisputed that the
motivating factor behind the eviction was the complaint filed with the
health department.2 The Consumer Protection Division of the North
Carolina Attorney General's Office brought suit in superior court seeking first a temporary restraining order 3 and later a preliminary injunction.4 Both motions were granted on the theory that the landlord's
action constituted a retaliatory eviction which runs counter to public
policy and, as such, violated the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive
Trade Practices statute.5 The logical basis for this theory is simple. A
man should not be punished for acting in the public interest and within
his rights by reporting health code violations. Such logic has been
adopted in an expanding minority6 of states, either by common law7 or
1. Carteret County, N.C., Health Dep't Notice, Aug. 12, 1974.
2. Supplemental Memorandum of Law at 1-2, State v. Cleve, 74 CVS 852
(Carteret County Super. Ct. 1974).
3. Judge Copeland (now an Associate Justice on the North Carolina Supreme
Court) granted this motion. State v. Cleve, 74 CVS 852 (Carteret County Super. Ct.
1974).
4. This motion was also granted. Id.
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975).
6. For the orthodox majority view see Gabriel v. Borowy, 324 Mass. 231, 234, 85
N.E.2d 435, 438 (1949) where the court states that "[a] landlord could at common law
terminate a tenancy at will for any purpose he might desire and the tenant could not
question his motives or attack his reasons."
7. Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Schweiger v. Superior
Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 507, 5,17, 476 P.2d 97, 103, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729, 735 (1970) (en banc);
Watts v. Lyles, 1 Pov. L. RFP. 2325.194 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Comm'rs Ct. 1968); Engler
v. Capitol Management Corp., 112 N.J. Super. 445, 447, 271 A.2d 615, 617 (App. Div.
1970); Portnoy v. Hill, 57 Misc. 2d 1097, -, 294 N.Y.S.2d 278, 281 (Binghampton City
CL 1968); Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 399, 173 N.W.2d 297, 301-02 (1970).
See also Wilkins v. Tibbets, 216 So. 2d 477, 479 (Fla. 1968) (Carroll, CJ., dissenting);
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 252-53, 297 N.E.2d 425, 428 (1973)
(dictum).
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by statute. 8 North Carolina is not among these. In the 1973-74 and
1975 sessions of the General Assembly, that body considered and
rejected landlord-tenant acts which included prohibitions against retaliatory evictions.9 Similarly the North Carolina appellate courts have
failed to adopt this doctrine. 10 Nevertheless State v. Cleve" or a
similar case will likely find its way to the North Carolina Supreme
Court. New legislation dealing with landlord-tenant relations will probably be introduced in the next session of the General Assembly. The
doctrine of retaliatory eviction will likely be accepted in North Carolina;
the major questions concern the form it will take. This article will
explore the reactions of other courts and legislatures to the problem and
identify those measures that have most effectively satisfied the goals of
the retaliatory eviction doctrine.
THEORY AND PURPOSE

Housing Code Reports
An understanding of the underlying philosophy and purpose of the
doctrine is critical to any analysis of the "means." The trend toward
allowing retaliatory eviction as a defense in eviction actions began"2 with
the landmark decision in Edwards v. Habib.'8 In that case defendant
reported sanitary code violations to the public health authorities. Over
forty violations were found and the landlord was ordered to remedy
them. The landlord, as required by law, gave the defendant thirty days
notice to vacate. When the tenant refused, the landlord brought a suit
for eviction which the tenant defended on the theory that the eviction
was retaliatory in nature and, as such, against public policy. The court
noted that the landlord had complied with all statutory requirements
and that he was under no duty to assign a reason for his eviction.
Nevertheless the court went on to say that "while the landlord may evict
for any legal reason or for no reason at all, he is not, we hold, free to
evict in retaliation for his tenant's report of housing code violations to
the authorities. As a matter of statutory construction and for reasons
8. See note 22 infra.

9. H. 673, [1973] N.C. General Assembly, 2d Sess.; H. 598, 11975] N.C. General
Assembly, 1st Sess.
10. Evans v. Rose, 12 N.C. App. 165, 182 S.E.2d 591 (1971).

11. 74 CVS 852 (Carteret County Super. Ct. 1974).
12. The first case which actually held for the tenant on the basis of retaliatory
2325.194 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Comm'r's Ct.,
eviction was Watts v. Lyles, Pov. L. RP.

1968).
13. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).

Although this was a decision by a federal

court, the court acted in the capacity of a state court for the District of Columbia.
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of public policy, such an eviction cannot be permitted."14 The court
reasoned that housing codes indicate a legislative intent to provide safe

and sanitary housing.

It recognized the practical fact that effective

implementation depends on private initiative in reporting violations.'

5

Therefore the court felt that permitting retaliatory evictions would
frustrate the effectiveness of the housing code.
Courts have generally followed this rationale in other slightly var-

ied applications of the retaliatory eviction doctrine. In Schweiger v.
Superior Court' the court found retaliatory eviction to be a defense to

eviction in a situation varying from Edwards in that the statute17 involved was one of self help for tenants rather than one concerning
reported code violations.' 8

Acknowledging Edwards, the court stated

that while District of Columbia Circuit opinions are not controlling
precedent, "the compulsion of persuasive reasoning is not circumscribed
by jurisdictional boundaries."' 19 This case exemplifies another important corollary of the doctrine, as it recognized "indirect" eviction. The

landlord evicted the tenant by raising his rent to an artificially high level.
When the tenant refused, paying only the previous rent less the cost of
repairs which he had performed himself, 0 the landlord commenced an
action in unlawful detainer in which judgment was granted. The
Supreme Court of California reversed that judgment. Other courts have

adopted this philosophy and disproportionate rent increases in retaliation are generally held to amount to eviction.2 '

Statutory provisions prohibiting eviction in retaliation for tenant
complaints or tenant actions in response to deficiencies in the dwelling

itselff22 appear to be enacted on a theory similar to that of Edwards.
14. Id. at 699.
15. Substantial numbers of violations investigated by the agencies originate from
tenant reports. See Note, Retaliatory Evictions: A Study of Existing Law and Proposed
Model Code, 11 WM. &MARY L. Ruv. 537 n.3 (1969).
16. 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970).
17. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1975).
18. The court discusses this distinction and concludes that the self help statute
requires even more protection. 3 Cal. 3d at 513, 476 P.2d at 100-01, 90 Cal. Rptr. at
732-33.
19. Id. at 513, 476 P.2d at 100, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 732.
20. Such a deduction is allowed by CAL. Cv. CODE § 1942 (West Supp. 1976).
21. See, e.g., E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 N.J. Super. 220, 281 A.2d 544
(App. Div. 1971).
22. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1976); CoNN. GEN. SrAT. ANN. §§ 19357a, 52-540a (Cum. Supp. 1976); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516 (1974); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966); ME. REv. SrAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Cum. Supp.
1975); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975); MAss. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 2A (1974); MicH. STAT. ANN. i 27A.5720 (Cune. Supp. 1975);
MmN.STAT. ANN. § 566.03, subd. 2 (Cum. Supp. 1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:42-
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Although the statutes do not set out reasons for their adoption,2 3 the
similarity in coverage between them and the case law suggests that they
most likely were based on the same philosophy.

As seen above, com-

mon law evolution refined the definitions of retaliatory eviction as new
situations arose. Statutory definitions too are in various stages of
development in coverage and complexity. All states which have statutes
proscribing retaliatory eviction directly forbid eviction in retaliation for
reporting building or health code violations. Comparable sections are
found in the two proposed uniform landlord-tenant acts. 2 4 A typical
provision would allow a defense to eviction proceedings where "[t]he
alleged termination was intended as a penalty for the defendant's good
faith report to a governmental authority of the plaintiff's violation of any
health, safety, housing or building codes or ordinances." 2 These provisions cover landlord conduct which the court rejected in Edwards.
Pennsylvania uses a somewhat different formula for encouraging
code adherence. In that state the tenant may place his rent in escrow if
the dwelling is adjudged to be unfit for human habitation. The act
provides that "[]o tenant shall be evicted for any reason whatsoever
while rent is deposited in escrow."2 Thus the statute adopts a stringent
prerequisite for protection as it demands an actual adjudication of
unfitness rather than a mere "bona fide complaint." This limitation in
scope reflects a more limited public policy behind the statute. Such a
provision serves only to mandate that houses already found to be unfit
be repaired. It does not encourage positive action by the tenant in
initiating the investigative process.
10.10 to -10.12 (Cam. Supp. 1975); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 8590(2) (McKinney
1974); R.L GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-20-10 (1969).
23. One of the earliest of these statutes states simply that "[i]t
is declared to be
against the public policy of the State for a landlord to terminate or refuse to renew a
lease or tenancy" because of bona fide complaints by a tenant of building code or health
ordinance violations. ILL. ANN. SrAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966). See also N.Y.
UNCONSOL. LAws § 8590(2) (McKinney 1974).
24. ABF MODEL REsiDENTiAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-407 (1969); UNFOm
REsIDENTLaL LNDLORD & TENANT Acr § 5.101 (1972).
25. MiNN. STAT. ANN.§ 566.03 subd. 2(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
27. For an analysis of why a statute should not protect good faith reporting, see the

ABF MoxEL

RErsDENTiAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE H§

2-407(2)(f), (4) (a), Commen-

tary (1969). These subsections disallow the retaliatory eviction defense when the
landlord shows that the building is in full compliance with the building codes. The
drafters acknowledge "mixed emotions" and concede that by writing in this provision
they "pro tanto defeat a major purpose of the section," encouragement of tenant
complaints. They base their decision on three factors: (1) there is less likelihood of
eviction when the building is in compliance, (2) the provision encourages the landlord
to comply with the codes, and (3) they do not like to restrict the landlord's freedom
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Some states have adopted legislation to protect the self help tenant
right which the California court protected by common law in Schweiger.
California itself now provides protection after the tenant "in good faith,
has given notice pursuant to" 28 the self help statute. Unlike the Penn-

sylvania statute, this provision requires only good faith by the tenant and
begins its coverage after notice to the landlord of problems rather than
after adjudication of unfitness and an escrow deposit by the tenant.
This type of statute is based on the broader policy of encouraging
tenant initiative in addition to the narrow code adherence policy.
The corollary advanced in Schweiger concerning indirect eviction
by rent increases has been adopted by several legislatures.2 9 The Connecticut statute, for example, states that "[n]o landlord shall...
demand an increase in rent from the tenant, or decrease the services to
which the tenant has been entitled" in retaliation for specified acts by
the tenant.30 In those states where statutes do not expressly forbid
disproportionate rent increases, the courts will likely follow the rationale
of Schweiger and include indirect evictions within the meaning of
retaliatory eviction."
Free Speech
Retaliatory eviction surfaced in another genre of cases-those dealing with free speech and association. The usual fact situation, represented by Church v. Allen Meadow Apartments,32 is eviction of a tenant
because he tried to form, or actively participated in, a tenants association. In Allen Meadows the court stated that the landlord's action was
motivated by the tenant's activities and that "[a]ny proceeding for
eviction so motivated and retaliatory is unconstitutional in that it seeks
to have a state penalize a person for exercising his constitutional rights
of free speech. 33 The Allen Meadows court approved the rationale
adopted in a federal decision, Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt 4 There
absent some showing of dereliction on his part. The Delaware retaliatory eviction
statute contains this same exception. DEL. CODE ANN.tit. 25, § 5516(c)(6) (1974).
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5(a)(1) (West Supp. 1975).
29. See, e.g., id. § 1942.5(a); MNN. SAT. ANN. § 566.03, subd. 2(2) (Cum. Supp.
1975); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-20-10 (1969).
30. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-375a (Cum.Supp. 1976).
31. This was done in E. & E. Newman, Inc. v. Hallock, 116 NJ. Super. 220, 281
A.2d 544 (App. Div. 1971).
32. 69 Misc. 2d 254, 329 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Onondaga County Sup. Ct. 1972). The
court denied the defendant's motion for a temporary injunction but noted that retaliatory
eviction was available as a defense.
33. Id. at -, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 149 (citation omitted).
34. 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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the court reasoned that tenants have a right to organize other tenants to
improve living conditions under the first amendment. As first amendment rights are incorporated under the fourteenth amendment, a state
"can take no action to prevent or penalize their exercise. '3' Thus "the
14th amendment prohibits a state court from evicting a tenant when the
overriding reason the landlord is seeking the eviction is to retaliate
against the tenant for an exercise of his constitutional rights." 80 Cases
dealing with tenants in government housing have approved this theory.8 7
The constitutional protection may be limited to disputes which
directly involve the tenant's occupancy. Incidents in which a landlord
evicts a tenant because he supported a particular political candidate, for
example, may be permissible. This issue was raised in Pohlman v.
Metropolitan Trailer Park, Inc.,38 where the landlord evicted a tenant
because he opposed the landlord's position on zoning regulations. The
court rather directly addressed this problem and suggested that a direct
relation between the dispute and occupancy need not be involved. It
did, however, find some need for a "reasonable" relationship between
the two. Although other state and federal courts do not directly discuss
this problem, many do refer to the purpose of the tenants association
and its relation to occupancy problems.3 9 Nevertheless, given state involvement through the judicial process, it is not readily apparent why
one form of constitutionally protected activity should be more favored
than the other. One interesting explanation suggests that because of the
competing freedoms of speech and association advocated by both landlord and tenant,4" the tenant's interest is not sufficient in itself to trigger
constitutional protection and thus the court needs a reasonable relation
to public policy considerations to resolve the "balance" in favor of the
tenant.
One situation not requiring an occupancy-related issue occurs
when a "suspect" equal protection issue, rather than a free speech issue,
is involved. Thus eviction for racial reasons would be rejected 41 and it
is likely that racial overtones in a free speech issue could supplant any
public policy factor, such as an occupancy-related dispute, required.
35. Id. at 504 (footnote omitted).
36. Id. at 506 (footnote omitted).
37. E.g., McQueen v. Druker, 317 F. Supp. 1122 (D. Mass. 1970).
38. 126 N.J. Super. 114, 312 A.2d 888 (Ch. 1973).
39. E.g., Engler v. Capital Management Corp., 112 N.J. Super. 445, 271 A.2d 615
(Ch. 1970).
40. See text accompanying note 42 infra.
41. Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309
(2d Dist. 1962).
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Constitutional protection of free speech through retaliatory eviction
defenses is not universally accepted, even on occupancy issues. In Aluli

v. Trusdell,42 a case involving a tenants association, the Hawaii Supreme Court rather ingeniously reversed the typical "free speech" ap-

proaches.

The court held that by evicting a tenant the landlord only

"lessened his interest" in the subject matter of the tenant's speech. He
did not foreclose it.43 Nothing was taken from him as the landlord has

the superior right to possession.

The court in affect argued that the

landlord's rights would be violated by disallowing eviction.

Further,

the court found no state action even though eviction was by judicial
enforcement. 4" Nevertheless, other jurisdictions4 5 faced with this issue
have found retaliation for free speech activities to be constitutionally
impermissible.
Statutory prohibitions against retaliation frequently include provi-

sions concerning free speech activities. 46

These provisions are usually

narrowly constructed and typically provide that a landlord may not
retaliate against a tenant because the "tenant is a member or organizer
of any tenants' organization. 47 Michigan passed a broad statute' protecting "lawful acts" with the limitation, however, that the acts protected
include only those arising out of the tenancy; a limitation similar to that
which some courts have suggested. 9 Probably the broadest provision,
one that appears to cover all free speech provisions including nonoccupancy-related disputes, was adopted by Rhode Island. That state
forbids retaliation when it "was intended as a penalty for any other
42. 54 Hawaii 417, 508 P.2d 1217, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040 (1973).
43. In practical terms the landlord's action may have the effect of foreclosing the
tenant's speech. Current housing shortages have led to an unequal bargaining position
between landlord and tenant in most areas. See, e.g., Sabato v. Sabato, 135 N.J. Super.
158, 342 A.2d 886 (Law Div. 1975); Pohlman v. Metropolitan Trailer Park, Inc., 126
N.J. Super. 114, 312 A.2d 888 (Ch. 1973). The tenant's problem in finding a suitable
replacement would cause the threat of eviction to have a chilling effect and thus
foreclose speech.
44. The New Jersey court in Pohlman v. Metropolitan Trailer Park, Inc., 126 NJ.
Super. 114, 312 A.2d 888 (Ch. 1973) seems to agree by dictum when it suggests that in
spite of eviction "there is no showing of governmental involvement in defendant's
conduct." Id. at 123, 312 A.2d at 892. Note also the dictum in Edwards v. Habib, 397
F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) in which Judge Wright suggests that the judicial action doctrine in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), may be limited to racial violations.
45. See, e.g., Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
46. California, Connecticut, and Minnesota do not provide such protection. In the
uniform codes the ABF version does not protect this activity while that of the Commissioners does. UNIFORM REsimD'rIL LANDLORD & TENANT AcT § 5.101(a)(3) (1972).
47. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-208.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
48. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5720 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
49. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
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Other ProtectedActivities
One tenant activity, which the statutes generally cover but which is
not dealt with in the common law, protects a tenant's attempts to enforce contract rights or rights granted by statutes. Minnesota provides
that a tenant cannot be evicted for a "good faith attempt to secure or
enforce rights under a lease or contract. . . or under the laws of the
state . ... "51 One statute extends protection to a tenant who only asks

the landlord to make repairs.52 Probably additional protection will be
extended as new situations arise.
Summary
These cases and statutes are based on substantially similar policy.
Courts have prohibited eviction when it would penalize a tenant, or act
as a threat to other tenants, for an exercise of tenant rights provided by
statute or by constitution. This policy represents the theoretical basis
that courts and legislatures must accept to fashion protection for tenants
against retaliatory eviction. Once this basis is accepted, however, the
most difficult problem-determining the practical operation of the doctrine-still remains. For example, is retaliatory eviction merely a defense or can it be the basis for positive action such as an injunction?
How does one find the retaliatory motive and how long does it last?
What remedy is appropriate? Can it be waived?
OFFENSE OR DEFENSE

One must first consider how the tenant should raise the issue. In
the cases discussed above, the courts usually allowed retaliatory eviction
as a defense to eviction proceedings initiated by the landlord." Because the doctrine first surfaced in most jurisdictions in this manner,
there is little doubt that it can be raised as an affirmative defense.
A split is developing, however, on whether retaliatory eviction can
be raised for purposes of injunctive relief. New York struggled with
50. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-20-10 (1969).
51. M'iN. STAT. ANN.§ 566.03, subd. 2(1) (Cure. Supp. 1976). Maryland forbids
evictions because a tenant files a lawsuit against the landlord. MD. REAL PROP. CODz
ANN.§§ 8-208.1(a)(2)(1)-(2) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
52. CoNN.GEN.STAT. ANN.§ 19-375a(a)(3) (Cure. Supp. 1976).
53. The court inMarkese v.Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, -, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 69
(Monroe County Ct. 1972), emphasized that "the court's process cannot be permitted to
be used to penalize someone for reporting a housing code violation .... "
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this issue over a period of years. The New York federal courts,
anticipating the probable decision of the state courts, refused to allow a
preliminary injunction on an otherwise valid constitutional claim by a
tenant on the theory that, should he be evicted, state law would permit
the claim as an affirmative defense.5 4 In a similar fact situation the
state did just that in Church v. Allen Meadows Apartments,5 5 in which
it denied a preliminary injunction but stated that it would allow the
claim as a defense to eviction proceedings.
A similar struggle in California seems headed for a different result.
In an early case, Hill v. Miller," involving racial discrimination, the
court held that while the tenant could not be lawfully evicted because of
his race, "the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose upon the state
the duty to take positive action to prohibit private discrimination of the
nature alleged here."5 7 Recently, however, the California Court of
Appeals, in Aweeka v. Bonds,5 8 indicated that the trial court had erred
in refusing to consider a preliminary injunction for the tenant. The
facts differ from the Miller case in that the indirect eviction was based
on the tenants' evident intent to invoke a self help statute for repairs in
their apartment. Nevertheless the court, noting a recent decision allowling retaliatory eviction as an affirmative defense, stated that "[w]e can
discern no rational basis for allowing such a substantive defense while
denying an affirmative cause of action." The court reasoned that it
"would be unfair and unreasonable to require a tenant, subjected to
retaliatory rent increase by the landlord, to wait and raise the matter as a
defense only, after he is confronted with an unlawful detainer action and
a possible lien on his personal property." 59 A reconciliation of the
views, however, lies in the fact that in the California case the tenant was
indirectly evicted through a disproportionate rent increase and, if he
waited until the landlord brought a forcible detainer action, he would
risk having to pay the exorbitant rent should he lose, in addition to
enduring liens on his property while the matter is resolved. In ordinary
summary ejectment, as in the New York cases, he would not suffer such
a disadvantage. Due to these considerations, the better reasoned60
54. Hosey v. Club Van Cortlandt, 299 F. Supp. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
55. 69 Misc. 2d 254, 329 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Onondaga County Sup. Ct. 1972).
56. 64 Cal. 2d 757, 415 P.2d 33, 51 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1966).
57. Id. at 759, 415 P.2d at 34, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
58. 20 Cal. App. 3d 278,97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1st Dist. 1971).
59. Id. at 281, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 652.
60. In Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973),
the court granted a preliminary injunction. The case involved a retaliatory discharge but
the court based its analysis on the probable results in a retaliatory eviction decision.
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decisions will, at a minimum, allow injunctive relief in instances of
retaliatory rent increases. In ordinary summary ejectment proceedings,
the argument is less forceful although there may be considerable remedial advantage to injunctive relief as is discussed below.
Of the statutes currently in force which prohibit retaliatory eviction, only New Jersey has provided the tenant with an injunctive remedy."' That statute, however, suffers from a "catch-22" provision which
may render it ineffective in the critical area of indirect evictions through
rent increases. The tenant is empowered to bring a civil action against
the landlord for damages and "other appropriate relief, including injunctive and other equitable remedies. ' 2 Use of this provision hinges
on the landlord violating the provisions of the section. Under the strict
language of the statute the landlord only violates the section when he
institutes an action to evict the tenant. Therefore the tenant who is
indirectly evicted by a disproportionate rent increase would be required
to wait until the landlord brought an action for dispossession based on
nonpayment of rent. As in the common law cases, this subjects the
tenant to a variety of evils including possible liens on his properties.
Other sections of the New Jersey statute, however, suggest that the
legislature had a different intent. In a section discussing presumptions,
the legislature referred to an action by the tenant and stated that "a
notice to quit or any substantial alterationof the terms of the tenancy
without cause"63 as a reprisal creates a presumption of retaliation
in certain circumstances. Clearly the legislature here contemplates injunctive relief being granted prior t6 notice to quit in the instance of
disproportionate rent increases. Courts dealing with this statute could
find the latter interpretation to be controlling of legislative intent or
possibly use that statute in conjunction with other statutory or common
law power to grant an injunction.6" In any event the statute is unclearly
worded and certain to cause confusion. As noted at the outset, most
statutes do not provide for any positive action by the tenant. Rather
they merely deny the landlord use of summary ejectment statutes when
the tenant successfully presents a retaliatory eviction defense. Absent
some other deterrent to landlord actions,65 this omission leaves a narrow
but clear gap in the tenant's protection.
61. NJ. STAT. ANN. tit 2A, § 42-10.10 (Cr. Supp. 1975).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 42-10.12 (emphasis added).

64. One statute which could be useful would be an unfair trade practices act as
discussed in text accompanying notes 66-73 infra.
65. Treble damages authorized by some statutes would serve to deter the landlord
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The North Carolina Attorney General's Office presented a quasistatutory theory to justify injunctive relief in a recent -eviction case
involving code violation reports. 66 The State alleged that the eviction
constituted an act in violation of North Carolina public policy as established by the housing code statutes.
Pointing to decisions of both the
federal government 6 and other state courts, the Attorney General reasoned that an act which violates the public policy of a state is an unfair
trade practice within the coverage of North Carolina's "little FTC
'
Act."69
The Attorney General is authorized by statute to "obtain a
mandatory order, including (but not limited to) permanent or temporary injunctions and temporary restraining orders. 70 The theory appears sound and merits consideration. It has been accepted in North
Carolina on at least the superior court level. In the case discussed
above, the court, in issuing a temporary injunction, found as a conclusion of law that "the acts and practices as described above violate the
provisions of G.S. 75-1.1 in that such acts and practices fail to provide
good faith and fair dealings between buyers and sellers; fail to maintain
ethical standards of dealings between persons engaged in business and
the consuming public; constitute unfair methods of competition; and are
unfair and deceptive acts and practices in the conduct of trade and
7
commerce." '
In one jurisdiction, a similar theory has received administrative
approval. Florida, in administrative rule 2-11.07,2 under the Florida
Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act,7 3 adopted the position
that retaliatory eviction is an unfair trade practice subject to injunction by the state.
PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

Much conflict has arisen among the various jurisdictions over the
nature of the proof needed to demonstrate retaliatory eviction and its
from such rent increase tactics. See ABF MODEL REsiDENTiAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE
§2-407(3) (1969).
66. State v. Cleve, 74 CVS 852 (Carteret County Super. Ct. 1974).
67. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-441 (Cum. Supp. 1974), as amended, [19751 Adv.
Legis. Serv., No. 5, at 683-84.
68. North Carolina gives weight to decisions under the federal FTC Act. Hardy v.
Toler, 288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1975).
70. Id. § 75-14.
71. State v. Cleve, 74 CVS 852 (Carteret County Super. Ct. 1974) (order for
preliminary injunction, Sept. 17, 1974).
72. 1 FLA. ADMInSRATiVE CODE 22, rule 2-11.07. This rule has been recognized
in Kendig v. Kendall Constr. Co., 294 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Ct. App. 1974).
73. FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 501.205 (1974).
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evidentiary effect. As retaliatory eviction constitutes a relatively new
defense, most of the litigation has centered on its theoretical validity.
The retaliatory motive is usually "given," probably because, when makig new law, courts use cases with minimal factual controversies in order
to keep the legal issues clearly in focus. Thus most courts to date have
dealt with admitted or obvious retaliation. Nevertheless the mechanics
of the defense must be worked out as more cases are brought and as
landlords, aware of the law, seek to disguise their actions.
Evidentiary requirements have been squarely faced at least once in
a New York case, Toms Point Apartments v. Goudzward.7" The court
held that the following elements must be shown: (1) the tenant must
have exercised a constitutional right in his action (this includes reporting a housing code violation); (2) the grievance must be "bona fide,
reasonable, serious in nature," and have a foundation in fact-it need
not have been adjudicated; (3) the tenant cannot have created the condition complained of; (4) the grievance must be present at the time the
landlord commences his proceedings; (5) the retaliation for the tenant's
exercise of rights must be the overriding reason the landlord seeks the
eviction.
The first two requirements, which amount to a good faith act by
the tenant, cannot be seriously questioned. They are a logical prerequisite. Also the final requirement of retaliatory motive seems beyond
challenge although, as will be discussed, it can be satisfied by proof or
presumption. The third and fourth elements are more debatable. If a
landlord has responsibility to remedy a situation as part of the contractual relation, it seems illogical that he should escape that duty solely
because a particular tenant caused it. The instance where the tenant
creates a problem deliberately to "qualify" for a retaliatory eviction
defense or violates his duty to the landlord could presumably be handled
under the language of the good faith elements. The situation in which
the landlord in fact is evicting the tenant because of his creation of the
problem rather than his reports of it would be dealt with through the
retaliatory motive requirement. The element as written has little flexibility and introduces unwanted rigidity into the law. The fourth element,
that the grievance be present at the commencement of proceedings by
the landlord, runs counter to part of the theoretical basis of the defense.
The requirement would be effective if one looks narrowly at the landlord and the particular tenant. The landlord can repair and then evict.
74. 72 Misc. 2d 629, 339 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Nassau County Dist. Ct. 1972).
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Thus the tenant leaves but the problem has been remedied. Compliance with the housing code, a frequently cited goal, has been secured
but other objectives have not been achieved.7 As commentators have
argued, 70 a retaliatory eviction produces ripples with cumulative effects.
Other tenants are put on notice that they may be evicted should they
air their grievances. In a time of housing shortages they may consider it
wiser to keep silent. The evicted tenant will certainly be a bit more
cautious about exercising his rights vis a vis his next landlord. In essence
there is a chilling effect. 77 Therefore the defense must be centered on
the tenant's report of the violation, not on the violation itself.
From the discussion above it is apparent that the elements of proof
enumerated by the New York court must be somewhat constricted in
order most effectively to promote the policy considerations behind the
retaliatory eviction doctrine. The tenant should be required to prove
only that at one time he had a bona fide or reasonable grievance; that he
acted on it pursuant to statutory or constitutional rights; that he was
evicted and that the primary motive for eviction was retaliation for his
78
exercise of those rights.
The elements can be proven by two methods. Most often they are
issues of fact to be decided by the appropriate fact finding body,
whether judge or jury.79 Determining the existence of a bona fide act
by the tenant and a subsequent eviction by the landlord presents little
problem for a fact finder. Some controversy may arise over whether the
problem was sufficient to force the tenant to act as he did. Far greater
problems arise in determining the motive of the landlord in evicting.
Like other issues of motive and intent, it can be resolved by a fact
finder8 but is likely to be a troublesome issue with great potential for
injustice. Often the tenant will not have the facts available which can
prove such an assertion. The landlord on the other hand would likely
have access to evidence which disproves retaliatory motive, such as
rising cost projections in the case of a rent increase.
75. This problem parallels that analyzed in the discussion of the theoretical basis of
the Pennsylvania statute. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
76. Annot., 40 A.L.R.3d 753, 755 (1971).
77. See note 43 supra.
78. This was adopted in Dickhut v. Norton, 45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297
(1970).
79. See Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968); La Chance v. Hoyt, 6
Conn. Cir. 207, 269 A.2d 303 (1969).
80. "'The question of permissible or impermissible purpose is one of fact for the
court or jury, and while such a determination is not easy, it is not significantly different
from problems with which the courts must deal in a host of other contexts ...
"
Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687, 702-03 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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There is, however, a way to avoid this problem for most retaliatory
eviction claims. Such evictions have primarily been in retaliation for
either tenant reports of health code violations or for connections with
tenant associations. The existence of these acts is proven by the first
two elements. Problems arise in proving the "motive" element. Courts
could deal with this situation by shifting the burden of proof to the
landlord to disprove a retaliatory motive when the first two elements
have been shown and the tenant has been evicted within a certain time
period thereafter. Thus the tenant could create a rebuttable presumption of retaliation. To date, however, most courts have been reluctant
to do so. In Cornell v. Dimmick81 a lower New York court, finding no
state statute prohibiting retaliatory eviction, recognized it as an equitable
defense. The court incorporated in that equitable defense a presumption of retaliatory eviction modeled on a city ordinance passed after the
case was decided at trial. Finding that the tenant made a report to the
code enforcement agency and that the landlord instituted eviction within
ninety days of that complaint, the court held that the tenant "became
entitled to the presumption that proceedings to evict were commenced as
a retaliatory measure."5' 2 The burden had now shifted to the landlord.
The method of proof used by the tenant can have considerable
effect on the quantum of proof required for the landlord's rebuttal.
When the question of motive goes to the fact finder without presumptions, as in Dickhut v. Norton,"3 the landlord need only prove that the
acts of the tenant were not the primary reason for the eviction. In the
burden of proof concept, however, the court may look to a more stringent standard. Following the lead of a New Jersey case, Silberg v.
Lipscomb, 4 the court in Cornell held that the landlord's burden could
only be satisfied by showing that "the decision to evict was reached
independent of any consideration of the activities of the tenants protected .

.

. ,,15

Thus Silberg and Cornell require that the landlord go

further and show that the decision to evict was independent of the
tenant's acts. The consequences of this difference were graphically
illustrated by the decision in Cornell. There the court expressly found
economic factors to be the "dominant reason" to evict, obviously enough
proof to reject retaliatory eviction in Dickhut, a question of fact jurisdic81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
City Ct.

73 Misc. 2d 384, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Binghamton City Ct. 1973).
Id. at -, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 279.
45 Wis. 2d 389, 173 N.W.2d 297 (1970).
117 N.J. Super. 491,285 A.2d 86 (Union County Dist. Ct. 1971).
Cornell v. Dimmick, 73 Misc. 2d 384, -, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275, 280 (Binghamton
1973).
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tion. Yet in Cornell the court finds it not to be enough as it found that
the retaliatory motive appeared to be too great for eviction to have been
"independently" arrived at. These variations could provide conflict in
the future as each jurisdiction decides for itself what measure of proof is
required for the landlord. 6
Legislatures have adopted requirements similar to those suggested
above on the elements of proof necessary to prove retaliatory eviction.
Rhode Island requires that the tenant allege and show by a preponderance of the evidence that he made a "justified" attempt to secure one of
certain enumerated rights, that the landlord is attempting -to evict him,
87
and that the eviction is intended as a "penalty" for the tenant's acts.
Some statutes, such as that of Rhode Island discussed above, do not
establish a system of presumptions. Many legislatures, however, have
gone this extra step and have worked out such a system. New Jersey,
for example, established rebuttable presumptions in a separate section of
its tenancy statutes.88 The statute requires a threshold finding of a good
faith action by the tenant and a subsequent eviction or substantial
alteration of the terms of the lease by the landlord without cause. Once
these are established, there arises "a rebuttable presumption that such
notice or alteration is a reprisal against the tenant" for his acts. Some
states have established variations on this scheme by inserting a specific
time period 9 during which eviction by the landlord would create such a
presumption. In these states eviction outside the time period would
presumably return the burden to the tenant.90 In a few instances a time
limit may be imposed beyond which no eviction may be deemed retaliatory. 91 The landlord's burden for overcoming the presumption will be
86. Special situations arise which allow the landlord to move the tenant out in spite
of a retaliatory motive. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 267 A.2d 833 (D.C. Ct.
App. 1970), exemplifies such a situation. After the landlord's property had been
determined unsafe and unsuitable for habitation because of code regulation violations, he
gave the tenant notice as prescribed and brought an action for eviction. Expressly
limiting Edwards v. Habib, the court of appeals held that rather than repair,. the landlord
may evict and withdraw his property from the rental market regardless of his retaliatory
intent.
87. R.L GEN. LAws ANN. § 34-20-10 (1969).
88. N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, § 42-10.12 (Supp. 1975).
89. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-375a (Cum. Supp. 1976) (sixty days);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit 25, § 5516(b) (1974); ME. REV. SrAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6001 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 239, § 2A (1974); Mic. STAT. ANN. §
27A.5720 (Cum. Supp. 1975); MWN,.STAT. ANN. § 566.03, subd. 2 (Cum. Supp. 1976)
(ninety days); ABF MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CoDE § 2-407 (1969) (six
months); UNIFoRm RESIDENTlAL LANDLORD & TENANT Acr § 5.101 (1972) (one year).
90. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 27A.5720 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
91. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 8-209.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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similar to that required by common law.9 2 The only case involving a
statute which has touched directly on this point, Silberg v. Lipscomb, 8
held that the landlord must show that the eviction was "independent" of
any consideration of the tenant's protected activity. Many courts, however, will probably require proof only that retaliation was not the
"dominant purpose" of the landlord. 4
REmDmS

Once the theory of retaliatory eviction is accepted and proven, the
court faces the final problem of what remedies should be available.
Initially the defense was used solely to prevent the tenant from being
evicted. Yet, as Judge Skelly Wright recognized from the outset in
Edwards v. Habib,9 5 even this simple remedy raises problems. The
court there stated that even if retaliatory eviction is shown, the tenant is
not "entitled to remain in possession of perpetuity. If this illegal
purpose is dissipated, the landlord can. . . evict his tenant or raise their
Controversy has
rents for economic or legitimate reasons . . . .,,

arisen primarily over what is required to "dissipate" the taint. A New
York court partially answered the question in Markese v. Cooper7
where it acknowledged Judge Wright's principles of dissipation but
expressed regret that he left no practical guidelines for trial courts. The
court formed its own guidelines, holding that "at a minimum.

. .

the

tenant should be permitted to remain until the landlord has made the
repairs required by law."98 As a minimum period this requirement
would serve to further the public policy of providing safe housing. Used
in conjunction with a rent escrow99 or self help10 0 statute, the time
period would be particularly effective. Once the repair duty is discharged, the courts face a more difficult task since the rights of the
92. See text accompanying notes 83-85 supra.
93. 117 NJ. Super. 491, 285 A.2d 86 (Union County Dist. Ct. 1971).
94. Statutes, like the case law, acknowledge situations where the landlord may evict
in spite of a retaliatory intent. CONN. GN. STAT. ANN. § 19-375a(b) (Cum. Supp.
1976) provides that notwithstanding the retaliatory eviction the landlord may recover
possession if the condition complained of was caused willfully by the tenant; notice was
given prior to the tenant's complaint; or if the tenant is using the property for a purpose
which is illegal or contrary to the rental terms. Id. § 19-375a(c) provides situations
where the landlord may increase rent in spite of a retaliatory intent.
95. 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
96. Id. at 702.
97. 70 Misc. 2d 478, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe County Ct. 1972).
98. Id. at -,

333 N.Y.S.2d at 75.

99. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Cur. Supp. 1975).
100. CAL. Civ. CoDn § 1942 (West Supp. 1975).

1976]

RETALIATORY EVICTION

landlord and tenant are then more evenly weighted. The court must
consider the second policy objective, prevention of the "chilling effect"
of the eviction. At the same time it should recognize that the landlord
too has important rights. A suggested solution should the landlord
maintain a retaliatory motive after the conditions have been remedied
would be to allow the tenant sufficient time from that point to find other
suitable housing.1 ' This solution has not been universally adopted.
Other courts would cut off the defense completely once the condition
has been remedied."0 2 The latter solution is overly rigid and does not
serve all of the policy goals underlying retaliatory eviction. It does offer
the advantage of simplicity and certainty.
Most statutes have treated retaliatory eviction as a defense to the
summary dispossession action of the landlord.10 3 Thus they often provide only that an eviction will not issue if retaliation be proven. They
have approached the dissipation problem with the same hesitancy ashave the common law cases. Illinois statutes say nothing on the issue.' 04
Presumably the courts must work out a formula on the same basis as is
done for common law evictions. In those states where the burden is
shifted for a specified period of time, 10 5 the landlord, in a new action,
must still overcome the presumption so long as the time period has not
elapsed. In addition some statutes create a cause of action when the
termination "was intended as a penalty for the defendant's justified
attempt to secure or enforce rights under.

. .

the laws of the state."'10

Arguably a defense of retaliation constitutes such an attempt. Thus
under such a law the tenant should be allowed a second period equivalent to that which he received after his first encounter with the landlord.
These time periods, it must be emphasized, do not prescribe the time
during which a tenant may not be evicted; they only specify the time
period during which he enjoys the presumption of retaliation. It is
likely, however, that he could successfully maintain his defense during
that period in most situations. After the time period expires most states
do allow the tenant his defense although the burden is on him. California, however, limits the tenant. The legislature proscribed retaliatory
evictions within sixty days of the tenant's acts but then provided that the
101. Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, -, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 75 (Monroe County
Ct. 1972).
102. Cornell v. Dimmick, 73 Misc. 2d 384, -, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Binghampton
City Ct. 1973).
103. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 566.03, subd. 2 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
104. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 80, § 71 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
105. See note 89 supra.
106. RI. GEN. Lws ANN. § 34-20-10(A) (1,969).
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tenant cannot invoke "the provisions of this section more than once in
any twelve-month period.' 7 Therefore the tenant can only rely on the
sixty days from the original act even to contest the eviction. Effectively
the taint is dissipated for the next ten months and the tenant is an open
08
target unless he can delay the decision in the first case for a full year.
Probably the most rigid statutory period was adopted in Maryland.
There no eviction is retaliatory after a six-month period following the
determination of the initial case by a court on the merits.10 9 Again
simplicity and certainty are the advantages.
Perhaps a better method of assuring such simplicitly and certainty
for both case law and statutes would be to adopt the injunctive remedies
discussed above."10 Although the courts would face essentially the
same problems and would answer them from the same considerations, the
court's decision would be "up front." The trial judge could indicate in
his order what time period, based on current market conditions, will be
required to dissipate the taint. Thus the landlord and tenant will not
have to guess and risk another court battle to find out how long the
tenant may remain.
In addition to the remedies discussed above, some courts have been
willing to grant compensatory and special damages and have suggested
that in some situations exemplary or punitive damages would be appropriate. In Markese v. Cooper,"' for example, the court allowed damages for retaliation under an equitable defense theory. It did so under
the authorization of a New York statute which allowed the answer to
contain any equitable defense or counterclaim. 12 In spite of the court's
"assumption" that damages are permissible, some jurisdictions may find
it difficult to award damages for an action which is essentially a defense.
These courts may consider damages to be too harsh in view of the
landlord's own problems.
A further problem may arise in defining the scope of general and
special damages. One court implicitly suggested that the unsanitary
107.

CAL. Ciw. CODE § 1942.5 (West Supp. 1975).
108. The statute is very confusing. For an analysis see Note, Retaliatory Eviction
in California: The Legislature Slams the Door and Boards Up the Windows, 46 S. CAL.
L. REv. 118 (1972).
109. MD. REAL PROP. CODE. ANN. § 8-208.1 (Cam. Supp. 1975).
110. See text accompanying notes 54-73 supra.
111. 70 Misc. 2d 478, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Monroe County Ct. 1972).
112. N.Y. REAL PRop. ActiONS § 743 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (Cum. Supp.
1975). The court seems procedurally confused: the damages should have been allowed
for a counterclaim Tather than a defense. Nevertheless, liberal pleading rules minimize
the importance of this flaw.
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condition complained of may be a basis for compensation in certain
circumstances. 113 The court denied damages because the tenant had
lived in the apartment for two preceeding winters and therefore had
notice of the excessive cost of heating due to a faulty furnace. The code
violation itself should not concern a court deciding a retaliatory eviction
claim. Such damage claims are outside the scope of the doctrine and
should have been discounted peremptorily unless, as the opinion does
not show, they were part of another claim based on code violations. 114 .
Any damages granted under a retaliatory eviction claim should be
limited to those which stem from the eviction. Such damages most
likely arise when the landlord uses self help or when he constructively
evicts the tenant by acts such as cutting off essential services. One
court, however, has gone so far as to suggest that it will entertain a
damages claim for intentional infliction of mental distress caused by the
landlord's attempts at eviction." 5 The court found that the relationship
between landlord and tenant was one which could be abused in a
manner so as to warrant these damages. No other court has gone this
far.
Legislatures have been as leery as courts about allowing damages.
A minimal recovery is provided by Maryland. That state allows the
tenant to recover attorney fees and court costs at the discretion of the
court." 6 Although the allowance of attorney's fees is generally punitive
in nature, 1" in most eviction cases they will reflect the actual damages
suffered by the tenant. Thus they provide a good minimal recovery.
New Jersey alone provides the tenant with a full statutory right to
maintain an action for "damages and other appropriate irelief.""-8 In
the only case directly applying this provision," 9 the New Jersey court
granted compensatory but not punitive damages. It stated that punitive
damages were not warranted on the facts of this case, 2 ° a clear implication that punitive damages may be awarded in other circumstances.
Although the court did not state its reasons for denying damages, it is
113. Cornell v. Dimmnick, 73 Misc. 2d 384, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275 (Binghampton City
Ct. 1973).
114. See Brown v. Southall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
.115. Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1st IDist. 1971).
116. MD. RFL PIRoP. CODE § 8-208.1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
117. D. DOBBs,HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEms § 3.8, at 197 (1973).
118. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10.10 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
119. Pohlman v. Metropolitan Trailer Park, Inc., 126 N.J. Super. 114, 312 A.2d 888
(Ch. 1973).
120. The tenants were evicted because they actively opposed the landlord on a
zoning ordinance issue. Id. at 117, 312 A.2d at 889.

880

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

possible that more evidence of a willful violation was needed. Also the
court may grant such damages more readily when stronger public
policy, such as that embodied in health codes, is involved. In any event,
guidelines are unclear at the moment.
Delaware allows the tenant to recover three months rent or treble
damages, whichever is greater, plus the cost of the suit.1 21 The statute
does not say how the tenant raises the damages issue although he would
likely use a section of the summary eviction provision which provides
that the "answer may contain any legal or equitable defense or counterclaim."'122 A uniform provision1 23 allows a similar recovery. In a
comment to that provision, the drafters stated its purpose to be to "put
teeth" into the prohibition. Another set of "teeth" involving treble
damages can be found in the unfair trade practice theory 24 in North
Carolina. Should the courts accept that theory, a recent unfair trade
practices decision, Hardy v. Toler,125 would likely allow treble damages
for the plaintiff.
WAIVER

A final question must be asked concerning the defense of retaliatory eviction. Can it be waived either expressly by contract or impliedly?
The common law has not dealt with this problem to date. Nevertheless
it is doubtful that a court could uphold a waiver absent some indication
that it was expressly bargained for by equal parties. The defense itself
is based largely on public policy recognition of the superior bargaining
position of the landlord. 26 Thus a waiver clause would likely be
considered another manifestation of this superior position and be voided
as contrary to public policy.
Most statutes have not dealt with the waiver question. California,
which does speak to the issue, disallows waiver. The statute provides
that "[a]ny waiver by a lessee of his rights under this section shall be
void as contrary to public policy.' 27 Because of these strong public
policy considerations, most other states with statutes will likely follow
this rationale.
121.
122.
123
124.
125.
126.
127.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5516(d) (1974).

Id. § 5709.
A3F MODEL REsiDENTAL LADLORD-TENANT CODE § 2-407(3) (1969).
See text accompanying notes 66-73 supra.
288 N.C. 303, 218 S.E.2d 342 (1975).
See note 43 supra.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942.5(c) (West Supp. 1975).
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CONCLUSION

As noted at the outset, this article begins with the assumption that
retaliatory eviction should be prohibited. It therefore foregoes an analysis of the merits of the doctrine and focuses on the form that such
prohibitions should take, by common law or by statute. It is difficult to
say which of these two modes would best serve the goals of the doctrine.
Legislative action delineates rights and duties far more surely and
cleanly than is possible under a case law approach. One judge in an
opinion holding for retaliatory eviction commented that "[u]nfortunate-'
ly, unless the legislature acts, these admittedly incomplete standards will
have to suffice until the slow hand of experience shapes new and better
ones. 128 Precise and detailed guidelines issued by the legislature
would shortcut much of the process that case law requires for effective
implementation. In addition, for law based on public policy, it is better
that the people's direct representatives, the legislature, adopt that law.
However, as the court indicated, the legislature must act. To date
legislatures have been slow to react to the changing needs of landlordtenant relations.' 2 9 Reform bills often never get to the legislative floor
or arrive in a totally emasculated form. Statutes may be enacted which
are ineffective to accomplish the real objectives of the doctrine. 130 In
these instances no law at all would be better as the tenants could more
easily persuade the courts to act. Thus both statutory and case law
serve a purpose and either can be an effective tool to implement the
prohibition in a given situation.
No matter which mode is used, it is imperative that those in a
decisionmaking position.understand the objectives which underlie the
doctrine. Without constant attention to these goals, decisions affecting
practical application will be inconsistent and at times contradictory.
Although the goals of retaliatory eviction are viewed differently by
various courts and legislatures, it is the view of this commentator that
the following model represents the most consistent and best reasoned
expressions. The primary function of the retaliatory eviction prohibition is to enforce building and health codes and thus to promote safe
and sanitary housing. The larger goal, however, must be understood in
128. Markese v. Cooper, 70 Misc. 2d 478, -, 333 N.Y.S.2d 63, 75 (Monroe County
CL 1972).
129. For a discussion of a legislative history behind landlord-tenant acts see Note,
46 S. CAL. L. REv. 118, supranote 108, at 120-25.
130. ABF MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT

(1969).

CODE § 2-407,
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terms of its two component objectives. First, the particular building
must be made to satisfy the codes. This objective is approached
through such means as rent escrow and tenant repair statutes. Statutes
which prohibit eviction until the violation has been remedied are another
example. The second component objective, prevention of a "chilling
effect" on tenant activities, has been less widely accepted. This policy
calls essentially for the encouragement of rightful tenant activities which
promote safe and sanitary housing. An example would be those statutes which provide the tenant with protection for "good faith" acts. This
objective deals with the landlord-tenant relationship rather than the
purely mechanical code enforcement process. Therefore it requires that
benefits to the tenant will be countered by detriments to the landlord
which in some cases may work unjust hardships. Nevertheless, this
policy must be accepted. Without this additional protection, housing
shortages and dislocation problems could potentially cause such timidity
among tenants as to drastically curtail code enforcement efforts.
With these twin objectives in mind a framework for practical
implementation of the doctrine can be devised.
Activity Protected
The primary activity protected is tenant reports to authorities about
In furtherance of the second
buildings and health code violations.
policy objective, all "good faith" reports should be protected whether
they constitute a violation or not. Similarly, protection should be
extended to good faith attempts by the tenant to invoke self help or
rent escrow statutes. Eviction in retaliation for a tenant's exercise of
free speech and associational rights presents a tougher dilemma. Such
retaliation should be proscribed but only in those instances in which the
activity bears a reasonable relationship to the tenancy. When there is
such a relationship the tenant should be protected by "retaliatory eviction policy" in addition to the constitutional protection which has often
been used in the past. The former basis would avoid potential state
action roadblocks. An easy example justifying protection would be
formation of a tenants' association. A situation closer to the borderline
would be that in which the tenant works for a general goal affecting
tenancy such as a state or local tenant rights bill. Such a situation
should probably be considered to be "reasonably related." Eviction for
free speech activities such as campaigning for a particular candidate,
while perhaps wrongful, should not be proscribed under laws based on
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the policy assumptions accepted for retaliatory eviction. They do not
violate those assumptions. Protection for this type of activity should be
based on constitutional grounds if they so qualify. Other acts such as
tenant attempts to enforce contract rights or "tenant rights laws" also
deserve protection. In addition there is a need to keep open the list of
protected activities as new situations deserving protection will undoubtedly arise. Language protecting "justified lawful acts" of the tenant may
serve this purpose, but such a provision must be narrowly construed to
include only those acts pertaining to the tenancy.
Eviction Defined
Eviction should include both actions in law, such as summary
dispossession initiated by the landlord, and disproportionate rent increases which are intended as a penalty for protected activities. Other
types of landlord activities such as constructive evictions through termination of essential services should also be included.
Type of Legal Action
Retaliatory eviction arises most naturally as an affirmative defense.
In addition, courts and legislatures should let it be raised as a counterclaim. This change would permit the court to award damages as further
deterrent to this type of willful landlord act. Finally, injunctive relief
should be permitted in those instances where the tenant could suffer
irreparable harm. A typical situation would occur when the landlord
has ordered a disproportionate rent increase.
Method of Proof
Retaliatory eviction is a question of fact for the appropriate fact
finder. The elements required to prove it should include (1) a good
faith "protected" act by the tenant, (2) an eviction, direct, indirect or
constructive, and (3) a primary motive of retaliation. The last element,
motive, should be presumed upon the tenant proving the protected act
followed within a stated time period, such as ninety days, by the eviction. This presumption could be rebutted by a showing by the landlord
that retaliation was not the primary motivation for the eviction. The "independent" motivation test is rejected as it does not substantially further
the named policy objectives.
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Remedies
Upon a showing of retaliatory eviction, the landlord's legal action
should be dismissed if he is directly evicting the tenant, or enjoined
should he be attempting an indirect or constructive eviction. The
tenant should be permitted to remain until the landlord remedies the
violation (thus satisfying the first policy goal) or until the tenant has
sufficient time to find other housing (thus satisfying the second),
whichever is later. Nevertheless the landlord should be permitted to
evict the tenant within this period if he can show a substantial economic
reason. The chance of landlord abuse of this exception through harassment is slight because, having lost once, he would not likely further
expose himself to a damage claim by the tenant without substantial
motivation. To increase deterrence for this and other objectives, the
tenant should be allowed to collect court costs, reasonable attorney's
fees and treble damages. Damage should include compensatory and
special damages which arise out of the eviction. In addition, where the
landlord's illegal act is particularly willful or malicious, punitive damages
should be readily permitted.
Waiver
Because of the disadvantaged bargaining position of the tenant
which underlies the entire policy, waiver should not be permitted.
CAVEAT

The proper form and procedure of retaliatory eviction cannot be
stated with absolute certainty. It is too recent a development for easy
answers. Time and experience will modify even the most carefully
thought out proposal. Social and political changes may even alter the
thrust of the policy goals behind the doctrine. The above discussion
attempts only to define those goals as they are now perceived and
examine existing alternatives with an emphasis on those measures which
are consistent and effective in the implementation of those goals.
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